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Positioning a fund for endowment and pension LPs

This guide covers how a fund manager can position a fund for pension and other institutional LPs. It draws on the writing of Richard C. Wilson about liquidity, performance, fees and coinvestment.[1][2] Staff, trustees and families who study the endowment model can use it to see what LPs weigh and what managers are asked to explain.[1][2]

Match liquidity to the structure

A family office executive interviewed for the Family Office book says an investor has to understand the liquidity of the trade.[1] That means the actual underlying liquidity of the instrument, not only what the documents say.[1] The executive's rule is plain. The liquidity of the instrument must match the liquidity of the structure.[1]

The executive gives an example of paper that was bought out at 60 cents on the dollar when its actual market value was 38 cents.[1] The executive notes that this much illiquid paper cannot be moved easily.[1]

The same executive adds a further point.[3] The executive compared the work to charging a hill, which needs air cover, artillery cover and ammunition supply.[3] An investor needs the proper talent to protect itself and achieve its mission.[3]

Why pension LPs look at alternatives

The executive notes that some people say they never do alternatives.[1] The executive then describes a pension manager with an assumption of 8% while bonds yield two and a half or three and a half.[1] The executive asks whether the stock market can supply that return with consistency over 10 or 11 years.[1]

The family office executive Richard C. Wilson interviewed said some people feel they cannot get there from here without alternatives.[3] This gap between the return assumption and the bond yield is the setting in which a fund is read.[1][3]

Performance comes first, then fees and terms

Richard C. Wilson writes that fees, a lack of transparency, poor liquidity and lockups have pushed some investors away.[2][4] He adds that perhaps the most important factor is mediocre or poor performance.[2][4] An investor will put up with a lot of inconveniences if a manager produces strong returns consistently.[2][4] What investors will not accept is consistently bad performance along with other issues.[2][4]

Some single family offices have looked elsewhere for alpha, including by launching an in house trading unit that copies the hedge fund model without the fees.[2][4] Richard C. Wilson also describes a fear that very large hedge fund titans grow comfortable and get fat off of fees.[4] He adds that some managers with billions in assets continue to justify their fees with outstanding consistent performance and inventive trading strategies.[4]

An interviewee in the Family Office book also asks how an investor with limited staff can tell good managers from bad ones.[1] The same question covers how to judge whether a manager is fraudulent and whether a good due diligence process is in place.[1]

Coinvestment rights and the mindset of the counterparty

Richard C. Wilson writes that general partners have resisted coinvestment rights for several reasons.[4][2] Coinvestment adds a layer of complexity to the fund.[4][2] The general partner gives up capital that would have gone into the standard fund vehicle.[4][2] Other LPs are more likely to ask for similar arrangements.[4][2] Allowing coinvestment also encourages future coinvestments and direct investments by investors.[4][2]

LPs ask for these rights for many of the same reasons.[4][2] They hope to reduce overall fees on private equity investments, manage more investments internally, gain more control through investments in companies and gradually build an in house direct investment platform.[4][2] The cost and complexity of a special purpose vehicle or a coinvestment fund can also be a burden on the GP.[4]

Richard C. Wilson teaches that it is important to understand the mindset of the counterparty.[2][4] The question is how much they need the capital and how much they are willing to concede to obtain a commitment.[2][4] Funds that are relatively new or lack strong investor support often seek to lure large investors with coinvestment rights, breaks on fees and other preferred terms.[2][4] In a tough capital raise, a coinvestment with a large commitment can be a much needed endorsement for the fund.[2][4]

Fund managers will not usually grant coinvestment rights to all investors in a fund.[4] Richard C. Wilson writes that he has never seen it occur.[2] The GP will seek to grant these rights only to investors that return a specific benefit.[4]

Steps you can take

  1. Describe the real liquidity of each underlying instrument, not only the terms in the documents.
  2. Check that the liquidity of the instrument matches the liquidity of the fund structure.
  3. Write down the return assumption an LP is trying to meet and how the fund fits it.
  4. Present performance plainly, since consistent performance is what investors keep coming back to.
  5. Explain fees, transparency, liquidity and lockups before an LP has to ask.
  6. Decide in advance which investors, if any, could be offered coinvestment rights and what benefit the fund would receive.
  7. Learn how much a counterparty needs the capital and how much it is willing to concede.

So, we see that it is important to understand the mindset of your counterparty and assess how much they need your capital and how much they are willing to concede to obtain your commitment.

Richard C. Wilson, The Single Family Office (Direct Investments edition)

Questions people ask next

What does matching liquidity mean?

A family office executive interviewed for the book says the liquidity of the instrument must match the liquidity of the structure.[1] The executive stresses the actual underlying liquidity of the instrument, not only what the documents say.[1]

Why do LPs ask for coinvestment rights?

Richard C. Wilson writes that LPs hope to reduce overall fees on private equity investments, manage more investments internally and gain more control.[4][2] They may also want to build an in house direct investment platform over time.[4][2]

Do managers give coinvestment rights to every investor?

Richard C. Wilson writes that fund managers will not usually grant these rights to all investors because of the complexity and burden involved.[4] The GP seeks to grant them only to investors that return a specific benefit.[4]

Sources
  1. Richard C. Wilson, Family Office book (Wiley)
  2. Richard C. Wilson, The Single Family Office (Direct Investments edition)
  3. Richard C. Wilson interview with a family office executive
  4. Richard C. Wilson, The Single Family Office

Related pages

Talk to Richard

Richard C. Wilson founded the Family Office Club and publishes Endowments.com. If you work at an endowment, advise one, raise capital from one, or run a family office that studies the endowment model, reach him directly. There is no form on this site.

Educational content only. Not investment, tax or legal advice. Endowment figures on profile pages come from the sources named on those pages.